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CASES NOTED
must be to prevail over a prior controlling decision does not lend
itself to easy solution."
It still remains the duty of federal courts, exercising due care and fore-
sight, to meet the challenge. To stay decisions in the absence of state law22
is to deny the litigants their due while burdening them with extra expense
of prolonged litigation. Should a party suffer in a diversity case because a
federal court is bound to prior court rulings and has to disregard more
recent dicta of a clear, unequivocal and contrary nature?" . . . . [Aill rules
of the law are for courts to apply- yes; but all rules of law are also for
the courts to change. . . . These changes and these applications should
indeed not depend upon the accident of diversity. . . . The poor litigating
parties should not be forgotten." 23
The Mason decision is equitable, it is correct. "Conflict with the past
is to be preferred over conflict with the future."2' 4
RlcauD E. Binauowrrz
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
OF FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A landowner brought action against the Government for damages caused
by the construction and maintenance of flood dikes. The Federal Tort
Claims Act' imposes liability upon the Government, ". . . where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant. , ",2 but excepts
"Any claim based upon . . . , the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function . . . , on the part of a federal
agency or employee of the Government."' Held, that the construction and
maintenance of the dikes involved the exercise of a discretionary function,
and therefore was not actionable. MeGillic v. United States, 153 F. Supp.
565 (D.N.D. 1957).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, waived the sovereign
immunity4 of the United States, with certain exceptions,5 in tort actions.
22. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 978 (1950)
23 Corbin, subra note 4, at 772
24. Id. at 776
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80
(Supp. IV 1956). The act was originally Title IV of The Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 842.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. IV 1956).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Supp. IV 1956).
4. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1938) (it is an established principle
of jurisprudence in all civilized nations, resting on reasons of public policy, because of
the inconvenience and danger which will follow from any different rule, that the sovereign
cannot be sued without its consent and permission); see also 53 AM. JUR., United States
§ 127 (1945).
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The purpose of the act was to relieve Congress of the burden of compensat-
ing citizens through the passage of private bills for tortious governmental
activities, and to create adequate remedies through judicially enforceable
rights.7
The general exception to governmental liability is predicated on the
discretionary function provision of the act. This has probably received the
greatest consideration of the courts due to the paucity of legislative obser-
vation of the exception's purpose.8 Early views of the act agreed that the
intent of the discretionary function exception was to exclude the substitution
of judicial opinion as to the correctness of an exercise of discretion9 for
that of the officially legally empowered to make that decision. 10
The principle that the Government should not be liable for its discre-
tionary acts when engaged in authorized activities, even if there has been
negligence or an abuse of such discretion, was the fundamental purpose for
including the discretionary function exception in the act." The decision in
the instant caseC 2 was based on that principle, and is consistent with prece-
5. 28 U. S. C § 2680 (Supp. IV 1956). This section lists eleven express exceptions
other than the discretionary function exception including those for assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepre-
sentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. Also expressly excepted are claims
arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter;
claims arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty; claims
for which a remedy is provided by the Suits in Admiralty Act or the Public Vessels Act;
claims arisinig out of the administration of The Trading With the Enemy Act; claims
for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine; claims for damages
caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary
system; claims arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces during
time of war; and claims arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority or
the Panama Canal Company.
6. See 11. R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945); Dalahite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which details the huge volume of bills with which Congress
had to continuously deal.
7. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946).
8. See, e.g., H. R. Rap. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1945); H. R. Ra.,
No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 3 (1940); Hearings before Commnitte on the Judiciary
on H. R. 5373 and 11. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1942). Legislative interpreta-
tion of discretionary function is of little assistance. Examples given are almost exclusively
limited to regulatory agencies; automobile collisions are the only specific examples of clear
liability given throughout the legislative materials. In fact, the illustrations were given by
representatives of the Department of Justice, which was responsible for the drafting of the
bill. Members of the Congressional committee did not attempt to explain the meaning
of the exception.
9. United States ex rel. United States Borax Co. v. Ickes, 98 F. 2d 271, 281 (D.C.
Cir. 1938). (Discretion in performing an act arises when it may be performed in one of
two or more ways, either of which would be lawful, and where it is left to the will, or
judgment of the performer to determine in which way it shall be performed, but when
a positive duty is enjoined and there is but one way in which it can be performed law-
fully, then there is no discretion); Markall v. Bowles, 58 F. Supp. 463, 465 (N. D. Cal.
1944), "Discretion as applied to authority of a public functionary means the power or
right to act officially according to what appears inst and proper under the circumstances."
10. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Coates v. United States, 181
F. 2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Gottlieb. The Federal Tort Claims Act - A Statutory
Interpretation, 35 CEo. L. J. 1, 44 (1946).
11. H. R. Rz. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1945).
12. Mc~illic v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 565 (D. N. D. 1957).
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dent.13 Thus, the unnecessary release of water through a dam 1" or the failure
to reinforce irrigation canals15 were held to be discretionary decisions. This
principle has not been confined to flood control or irrigation projects16 and
includes other official or administrative decisions and acts authorized by
statute.17 Therefore, the Government was not liable for decisions made in
issuing permits' 8 or weather forecasts,' 9 or for the admitting and discharg-
ing of patients from its hospitals.20
When a governmental agency has been under a common law or statutory
duty to act in a specific way and intentionally has not, the courts have
refused to extend the protection of the discretionary function exception.
Thus, when the Coast Guard failed in a mandatory duty imposed by statute
to mark or remove wrecked ships2' and when an interne negligently treated
13. Ure v. United States, 225 F. 2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955); Williams v. United States,
218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955); Coates v. United States, 181 F. 2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950);
Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Snpp. 651 (S. D. Cal. 1955); Barroll v.
United States, 135 F. Supp. 441 (D. Md. 1955); Avina v. United States, 115 F. Supp.
579 (W. D. Tex. 1953); Danner v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 477 (W. D. Mo. 1953);
North v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1950); Boyce v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Olson v. United States, 93 F. Stpp. 150 (D. N.D.
1950); Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 89 F. Supp. 978 (XV. D.
Va. 1950); Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
14. Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D. N.D. 1950); Pacific Nat. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 89 F. Supp. 978 (W. D. Va. 1950) (damages
caused by blasting during the construction of a dam).
15. Ure v. United States, 225 F. 2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
16. Dalahite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (export program considered a
protected government activity); Harris v. United States, 205 F. 2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953)
(crops destroyed by spread of herbicide from government property); Sickman v. United
States, 184 F. 2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950) (wild geese on government preserve damaging
neighboring fields); Bartholomae v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S. D. Cal. 1955)
(No liability for damages caused by atomic blasting); F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 322 (E. D. N.Y. 1954) (Navy not liabile for negligent
dredging operations); Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D. Puerto Rico 1951)(diseased tree falling on car at government experimental station).
17. Schmidt v. United States, 344 U.S. 896 (1952) (exempts investigatory activity
of S.E.C. from liability); Goodwill Industries of El Paso v. United States, 218 F. 2d
270 (5th Cir. 1954); Kline v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 298 (S. D. Tex. 1953) (Coast
Guard not replacing coast guide lights); Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
124 (S. D. lowa 1949) (Secretary of Interior's seizure of coal mine); Kendrick v. United
States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N. D. Ala. 1949.
18. Chournos v. United States, 343 U.S. 977 (1952) (failure to grant grazing
permits); Weinstein v. United States, 244 F. 2d 68 (3d Cir. 1957) (negligence of gov-
erment inspector); Powell v. United States, 233 F. 2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956); Dupree
v. United States, 146 F. Supp. (E. D. Pa. 1956) (Coast Guard's denial of license).
19. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954); Mid-
Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (V. D. Mo. 1953); Western Mer-
cantile Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Mo. 1953). The rationale of
the courts is that since the operation of weather information service creates no duty, there
can be no negligence, and thus no recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
20. Smart v. United States, 207 F. 2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953): Denny v. United
States, 171 F. 2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948); Dugan v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 674 (D.
D.C. 1956); Contra, Fair v. United States, 234 F. 2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
21. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F. 2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); accord,
Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 138 F. SupD. 16 (S. D. N. Y. 1956). For
similar results, see Oman v. United States, 179 F. 2d 738 (10th Cir. 1950) (an official
refused to cancel a grazing permit as required by regulations); Ellison v. United States,
98 F. Supp. 18 (D. Nev. 1951) (government liable for diverting a water supply, contrary
to a court decree, in conjunction with a proprietary project).
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a patient after admittance to its hospital, the Government was held liable.22
When an individual can only act legally in one way, there is no discretion
involved but merely a failure in a duty.2 3 The courts have beclouded the
issue in these cases by referring to "negligence after the exercise of discre-
tion, etc." in an attempt to justify their avoidance of the discretionary func-
tion exception.
The United States, until recently, claimed immunity for all conduct in
furtherance of the "end-objectives" of "uniquely governmental functions"
which had no counterpart in private business. 2 9 In addition, it claimed that
when the project or activity was discretionary in its entirety, then all con-
duct performed in furtherance of that activity was discretionary and non-
actionable. 5 In Dalahite v. United States,2 1 the entire Texas City port was
leveled by an explosion which occurred during the loading of fertilizer for
shipment abroad as part of our Foreign Aid program. The catstrophe was
allegedly caused by the negligent packing and shipping of the fertilizer and
the failure of the Coast Guard to supervise the loading or to combat the
fire. The Court concluded that there can be no liability for purely govern-
mental functions and that once a high-level policy determination has been
made which invokes the immunity of the discretionary function exception
of the act, the immunity extends throughout the implementation of the
22. United States v. Gray, 199 F. 2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952); accord, Grigalaukas v.
United States, 181 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F. 2d 1(10th Cir. 1949) Rufino v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. N. Y. 1954); Dish-
man v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950). For other cases holding Gov-
ernment liable for failing in a common law duty, see United States v. Trubow, 214 F. 2d
192 (9th Cir. 1954) (failure as a landholder to keep its premises safe); United States v.
White, 211 F. 2d 79 (9th Cir. 1954) (failure to warn business invitees of dangers);
Maryland v. Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., 176 F. 2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949) (failure
to keep its premises safe).
23. See sujora note 9.
24. Dalahite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950) (the Army is a uniquely governmental function); Goodwill Industries of
El Paso v. United States, 218 F. 2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954) (migratory camps); Sigmon v.
United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W. D. Va. 1953) (Army). Cases cited note 13 supra.
25. Dalahite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1955); Williams v. United States, 218
F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955) (Florida District Court refused to inquire into cause of
government experimental plane which exploded in mid-air. This rationale was criticized
by the Court of Appeals, but the decision was affirmed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur); Coates v. United States, 181 F. 2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Toledo v. United
States, 95 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D. Puerto Rico 1950); Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp.
866 (S. D. Iowa 1950), For a few early sagacious decisions (pre Dalahite) which held
contra by distinguishing between high-level policy decisions and those necessarily made
by subordinates in performing their tasks and holding the latter liable for negligent
decisions, see Worley v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 719 (D. Ore. 1952) (negligent
setting of poisoned animal traps); Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S. D. Iowa
1950) (by way of dictum the court indicated the exception would not apply to low
level employees if they deviated from discretionary plans of supervisors); Ilabbleton v.
United States, 87 F. Supp. 994 (W. D. Wash. 1949) (negligent cross examination of
witness by Army sergeant).
26. 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (consolidated suits represented some 8,485 plaintiffs for
damages amounting to $200,000,000).
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decision.2t The minority reasoned that Congress intended such discretionary
immunity to apply only to high-level decisions and that the immunity does
not extend to the operational phase of policy decisions . 8 This theory has
been greatly modified by the decisions in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States20 and United States v. Union Trust Co.:0 THie former concluded that
the Government may be liable for negligence in carrying out a "uniquely
governmental function;" its liability being predicated on the local law
applicable to private citizens and not that applicable to municipal corpora-
tions. The latter held that the discretionary function immunity refers to
decisions' at the planning level which are necessary to the success of the
overall project, and not to decisions made by employees in handling the
operational details of the program. 3 There are decisions since Dalahite
which hold that once an employee or agent of the Government has exer-
cised his discretion, reasonable care must be used in pursuing the course he
has decided to follow. 3 2 The judiciary has apparently realized the inequitable
implications of Dalahite,8 and although not expressly overruling it, there
27. Reed, J., Id. at 35, "the 'discretionary function or duty' . . . includes more
than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by
executives or admistrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions. Where there is room for policy judgment there is discretion."
28. Jackson, J., dissenting, Id. at 58, "if decisions are being made at cabinet levels
as to the temperature of bagging explosive fertilizers, ...and how the bags should be
labeled, perhaps an increased sense of caution even at that height would be wholesome.
The common sense of this matter is that a policy adopted in the exercise of an immune
discretion was carried out carelessly by those in charge of detail. We cannot agree that
all the way down the line there is immunity ..
29. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
30. 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
31. Accord Air Transp. Associates Inc. v. United States, 221 F. 2d 467 (9th Cir.
1955) (government liability based on negligence of. control tower personnel at Air
Force base).
32. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); United States v.
Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Fair v. United States, 234 F. 2d 288 (5th Cir.
1956) (liability imposed for negligent discretion at operational level in releasing psycho-
path from hospital); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F. 2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956); Air
Transp. Associates Inc. v. United States, 221 F. 2d 467 (9th Cir. 195 5); United States
v. White, 211 F. 2d 79 (9th Cir. 1954); Crouse v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 47(D. Del. 1955) (Army sergeant driving truck on designated route not exercising discre-
tionaray function); Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955) (Nuclear
tests; not every act connected to program necessarily involves discretion); Atkinson Co. v.
Merritt, Chapman, and Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406 (N. D. Cal. 1954); Rufino v.
United States, 126 F. Supp. 132 (S. D. N. Y. 1954) (liability for negligence in admin-
istering drugs); Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (D. N.J. 1954);
Bevilaqua v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 493 (W. D. Pa. 1954) (liability for failure
of employee to carry out orders); Smith v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 80 (D. Del. 1953)
(where employees act tinder no plan or contrary to one, there is no immunity); Hernan-
dez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii 1953) (discretion in deciding to
erect a road block, but liable for not giving adequate warning).
33. 346 U.S. at 60, Jackson, J., dissenting. "Surely a state so long debated was
meant to embrace more than traffic accidents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine
that "The King can do no wrong" has not been uprooted; it has merely been amended
to read, "The King can do only little wrongs."
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has been an obvious change of attitude on the part of the Supreme Court.34
Thus, a recent district court case,35 which originally cited Dalahite, held
that discretionary immunity extended to the pilot of a low-flying plane
performing survey work in conformance with government plans. This was
reversed by the court of appeals which held that the Government exercised
its discretion in deciding to use its pilots in making the survey, and even
though the pilot was following orders, the injury resulted simply because
the pilot did not look where he was going. The reversal completely ignored
Dalahite and cited only the the decision in Indian Towing Co. which had
been handed down earlier in the same week as the reversal.
It seems without question that the Supreme Court will now hold the
Government liable for the negligent conduct of its employees engaged in
the operational details of any governmental activity. This desirable result
of a liberalization of the general applicability of the Federal Tort Claims
Act has been brought about by judicial realization of its duty to interpret
strictly the discretionary function exception. In the instant case, the plain-
tiff's allegation of damage caused by the Government's decision to build a
dike was at most an allegation that the Government bad abused its discretion
in carrying out an authorized program. It appears in the light of recent
decisions, that if the plaintiff had alleged negligence in the actual construc-
tion of the dike, or negligence in some operational aspect of the project, the
Government would not have been entitled to a dismissal. 36 In view of the
34, Pennsylvania R. R., supra note 32, wherein it was held that negligence of Coast
Guard charged with supervision of loading would not be discretion. But see Dalabite,
suPra note 32, in which the majority would not hold Coast Guard liable for negligence
in regulating loading or fighting the fire. For an excellent review of the modem trend
see, Fair v. United States, 234 F. 2d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 1956), "It is further worthy of
note that the minority in Dalahite, whose dissent was indicative of the desire to give
broad extension to the Tort Claim Act, had become the majority in Indian Towing Co.
A reading of the opinions and the dissents in the two cases leads to the conclusion that
Indian Towing Co. represents a definite change of attitude on the part of the Supreme
Court."
35. Dahlstrom v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 772 (D. Minn. 1955), rev'd 228 F. 2d
819 (8th Cir. 1956).
36. Rayonier Inc. v. United States, U.S. 77 S. Ct. 374 (1957) (government liable
in fighting fire on own land if negligent) reaffirmed, Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. 61
(1955), and Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Friday v. United States, 239 F.
2d 701 (9th Cir. 1957) (no discretion in supervisor not allowing truck driver to sleep;
cuts discretionary immunity off at high level) Pierce v. United States, 235 F. 2d 366 (6th
Cir. 1956) (government owes due care, even if entire project is an authorized program);
State of California v. United States, 151 F. Stpp. 570 (N. D. Cal. 1957) (the exception
only applies to planning level and not operational level); Bartholomae Corp. v. United
States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S. D. Cal. 1955) (the government is not liable for expert's
decisions in atomic blasting); Sullivan v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 713 (N. D. Ill. 1955)
(when an F. B. 1. agent in making an arrest drives negligently, there is no discretion);
Desert Beach Corp. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 581 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (irrigation
canal is discretionary. but if specific negligence is alleged in acts of employee, government
cannot get a directed verdict); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman, and Scott Corp.,
126 F. Supp. 406 (N. 0. Cal. 1954) (the government is not entitled to summary judg-
ment on basis of discretionary function in authorizing entire dam project; specific act
complained of might have been a job incidental to a discretionary decision; more evidence
was needed as to who made the specific decision).
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facts and presentation of the plaintiff's case, the decision of the court, based
on the immunity of governmental discretion, cannot be questioned.
RONALD E. KAY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTEMPT OF COURT-
NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPHERS
Plaintiff newspaper sought to enjoin enforcement of a state court order
prohibiting representatives of the press from taking pictures in and in the
vicinity of the court room during the progress of a trial. Held, injunction
refused. The state court has the right to prohibit the taking of pictures
during a trial. This restriction to uphold the dignity of the court is not a
violation of freedom of the press. Tribune Review Publishing Company v.
Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Pa. 1957.)'
It has never been questioned that the courts have a right to punish
persons disturbing the administration of justice when these disturbances
are committed in the presence of the court.2 An inherent function of the
judicial system is the duty of the courts to conduct proceedings with fitting
dignity and decorum.' Where photographers disturbed the proceedings of
a trial by exploding flash powder, they were held in contempt for detracting
from the decorum of the court.4 Court orders have been promulgated which
bar photographers from taking pictures during court proceedings on the
theory that the presence of cameramen would potentially detract from the
dignity and decorum of the court.5
1. The Westmoreland County Court during the trial of John Wesley Wabel,
"The Phantom Killer of the Turnpike," Commonwcalth v. \Vabcl, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A. 2d334 (1955), promulgated a court rule prohibiting the taking of pictures in the court
house or within 40 feet of the entrance of any court room. Rule 6084 of the courts ofWestmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Press photographers took pictures of \Vabel on his
way into court for sentencing in direct violation of this order. They used infra-red camera
and did not attract attention or distract the court. The photographers were cited for
contempt of court when the pictures appeared in print. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, the convictions were upheld although the jail sentences were
vacated. In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A. 2d 679 (1956). The Supreme Court of theUnited States denied certiorari, Mack v. Pennsylvania, 352 U.S. 1002 (1956), and the
plaintiffs brought this test case into the Federal Court.
2. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
3. Judicial canon 35 provides; "Proceedings in court should be conducted withfitting dignity and decorum. The taking of Photographs in the court room, during
sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of
court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings,
distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions
with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted."
4. In re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. S. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
5. State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E. 2d 8 (1954).
